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Abstract
Stock markets perform a creation function if the inflow of financial cap-
ital in the birth of new privately-held firms is stimulated by the promise of
stock market liquidity at a later point in time. Junior stock market seg-
ments, characterized by lighter listing procedures and costs, may be suited
to perform a creation function, but their liquidity promise may not be re-
liable due information opacity. We test the creation function of the Alter-
native Investment Market (AIM), the junior segment of the London Stock
Exchange (LSE), by means of dynamic panel data models, where entry at
the sectoral level is regressed on capital raised at IPO on AIM and on the
LSE main market, venture capital investments, and control variables. Our
sample includes UK manufacturing sectors over the 2004-2012 time span.
We find that sectors that raised more capital at IPO on AIM housed more
new entrants in the subsequent years, whereas the results on main market
IPOs and venture capital financing are mixed. The magnitude of this effect
increases as the amounts of raised capital are aggregated over longer time
horizons. Results are confirmed after endogeneity tests (pseudo diff-in-diff
and 2-stage residual inclusion estimators).
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1 Introduction
As shown by recent research on industrial dynamics, unleashing the growth po-
tential of new firms is what really matters for innovation and employment growth
in advanced economies (see Mazzucato, 2011, 2013; Nightingale and Coad, 2014).
The collective, cumulative, and uncertain nature of the innovation process is well
known as making the exploitation of technological opportunities complex and chal-
lenging. However, the innovation process requires financial resources in order to
sustain the accumulation of capabilities from the time at which the investments
are undertaken to the time when products generate sales. New firms rarely possess
these resources and can hardly rely on the traditional banking channel. Banks are
reluctant to finance small new firms because of information asymmetries and rad-
ical uncertainty (Beck et al., 2005; Beck and Demigurc¸-Kunt, 2006). In addition,
young firms in Europe are facing increasing difficulties since the implementation of
the Basel agreements (Saurina and Trucharte, 2007, Scellato and Ughetto, 2010,
Cardone-Riportella et al., 2011). Quoting an OECD report (Wehinger, 2012)
“With the banking sector expected to shrink considerably other actors, especially
institutional investors, and new forms of financial intermediation will have to meet
the credit needs of the economy”.
Junior stock markets, i.e. stock markets catering to small caps, represent one
of these new forms (Giudici and Roosenboom, 2004; Bottazzi and Da Rin, 2005;
Posner, 2009). In the last 20 years, business and policy actors have increasingly
viewed stock markets as an alternative to the banking system and have pursued an
increasing deregulation of financial markets. One deregulation strategy has con-
sisted in lowering the admission requirements and in outsourcing the regulatory
responsibilities to specialized financial intermediaries. These are the core princi-
ples of a junior stock market. The longest standing and the most capitalized junior
stock market is the Alternative Investment Market (AIM), a segment of the Lon-
don Stock Exchange (LSE). The companies seeking admission in AIM face lighter
regulation and disclosure rules with respect to the official list, and incur lower
admission and listings costs (see Rousseau, 2007). Companies are not required to
comply with corporate governance and internal control standards.
Even if there is no consensus on the desirability of allowing SMEs to go public
(Revest and Sapio, 2013a and 2014; Lagneau-Ymonet et al. 2014; Hornok, 2014),
the AIM capitalization has been expanding and its architecture has been emulated
worldwide (Alternext, Tokyo AIM, JASDAQ, First North, AIM Italia, and so
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forth). The deregulation of stock market listing begs the question as to whether
the real economy will benefit in terms of job creation and growth. In increasingly
market-oriented economic systems, policy-makers tend to identify job creation with
new business formation and entrepreneurial activity (Haltiwanger et al., 2013).
Yet, to the best of our knowledge, no research has been devoted to assessing
whether junior stock markets, seen as a specific form of financial deregulation,
foster new business creation.
In this paper, we fill this gap by studying whether the propensity to rely on
AIM as a source of new equity translates into a higher rate of new firm formation,
using sector-level data on UK manufacturing. This is, we believe, a worthwhile
endeavor for more than a reason.
First, the literature offers several insights on new business creation as a dynamic
process triggered, among other factors, by the expected availability of capital in-
jections. Michelacci and Suarez (2004) argued that the stock market encourages
business creation because it allows recycling of capital proceeds by providers of
informed capital, such as venture capitalists (see also Black and Gilson 1999). Ac-
cording to this view, the deregulation of stock market listing would allow a faster
rate of capital recycling, and hence a wider availability of financial sources for star-
tups in a given time frame. Similarly, Lazonick (2007) maintains that the stock
market exercises a creation function for the innovative enterprise: the liquidity
promise implicit in stock market trading (a future option for a startup) stimulates
the inflow of equity capital at startup time. On her side, Sevilir (2010) has theo-
rized on the strategic complementarity between the availability of venture capital
and the investments in generic knowledge by incumbents, showing that the latter
can trigger spinoffs.
Second, in junior stock markets, most listing decisions are enacted through
private placements; the percentage of free float is rather negligible (see evidence in
Vismara et al. 2012). Investors on junior stock markets are willing to retain their
shareholding perhaps even on a longer horizon than venture capital and, similarly
to them, target companies with high (albeit uncertain) returns. As argued by
Hornok (2014), junior stock markets exemplify structured and formal markets for
liquidity, providing exit opportunities to old and new investors.
Third, the increasing depth of stock markets is at least as relevant as other
determinants of entry and post-entry growth (Aghion et al. 2007). Stock market
depth is more growth-enhancing for industries that rely more on small firms (Beck
et al., 2005) and on firms that are more dependent on external financing (Klapper
et al., 2006). A focus on how specific forms of capital sourcing affect entry may
help dissipate the doubts that have emerged on the stability and linearity of the
aggregate finance-growth relationship, with studies highlighting a declining effect
of finance for higher income countries (Aghion et al., 2004; Rioja and Valev, 2004;
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Koetter and Wedow, 2010; Rousseau and Wachtel, 2011; Arcand et al., 2015).
We analyze the time dynamics of entry at the sectoral aggregation level by
estimating dynamic panel data models. Our sample includes UK 3-digit sectors in
manufacturing (NACE Rev. 2 codes from 101 to 332) over the 2004-2012 time span.
The dependent variable is the number of births to UK manufacturing sectors, as
provided by the Office for National Statistics (ONS). In order to catch the intensity
of equity market support to new firms, we use the money raised at IPO, measured
at the sectoral level, for both AIM and the LSE main market (source: LSE), as
well as venture capital investments by sector (source: BVCA). If the junior stock
market performs a creation or recycling function, one should observe more entry
in sectors that relied more on AIM, ceteris paribus.
Our closest reference in the literature is Popov and Roosenboom (2013), yet
instead of studying the impact of VC on new business creation, we focus on the
impact of a junior stock market, controlling for VC too. Our approach departs
from Aghion et al. (2007) and related literature: rather than focusing on aggregate
measures of financial depth, we wish to disentangle the separate effects of a relative
liquid junior market (the AIM) from those of its parent exchange and from other
non-bank financial channels, such as venture capital. Our contribution is original
because we build a bridge between the microeconomic determinants of firm entry,
mirroring the motivations of the entrepreneurs, and the functions performed by a
specific stock market. On the econometric side, we rely on models that are more
suitable to deal with the count nature of the entry data and allow for non-linear
effects.
Based on our findings, we conclude that the AIM has performed a creation or
recycling function for UK manufacturing firms, unlike the LSE main market or
venture capital. All things being equal, sectors that raised more capital at IPO
on AIM and with more AIM-listed small caps were also those housing more new
entrants in the subsequent years. The magnitude of this effect increases as the
amounts of raised capital are aggregated over longer time horizons, when prospec-
tive entrants have better chances to disentangle the signals of interest from the
short-term noise; and is stronger than for alternative financing sources, such as
IPO proceeds on the LSE Main Market, which is negative in some specifications.
The effect of AIM funding, moreover, is more delayed in time than the effect of
main market IPOs. Venture capital (when measured in deals, but not in disburse-
ments) is a positive driver of entry. These effects survive to various robustness
checks, when we control for a possible omitted variables bias through the pseudo
diff-in-diff technique introduced by Rajan and Zingales (1998), interacting the
stock market variables with industry concentration, and when we estimate a 2-
stage residual inclusion model allowing for exogenous variation in the supply of
finance by institutional investors.
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Our conjecture is that prospective entrepreneurs use information from markets
dominated by institutional investors (AIM, venture capital) in order to assess the
chances of drawing finance prior to firm foundation, whereas in sectors that rely
more on main market IPOs, incumbents may limit entry in order to sustain their
stock prices.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the theoretical back-
ground, illustrating the principles that guide junior stock markets, the existing
evidence on firm entry, and how stock markets may affect the entry process. Data
and variables described in Section 3 are used through the empirical methods of
Section 4 to obtain the results (Section 5). Section 6 wraps up and concludes.
2 Theoretical background
2.1 Junior stock markets
The main organizational specificity of AIM, and of other junior stock markets
modeled after it, is a combination of low admission requirements with information
disclosure processes centered on financial intermediaries known as Nominated Ad-
visors, or Nomads. AIM does not set any minimal initial requirement in terms of
capitalization, assets, equity capital, trading history, free oat. A Nomad must be
appointed by every company seeking admission on AIM (Rousseau, 2007). No-
mads assess whether a company is suitable for quotation by carrying out an ex-
amination of the applicants’ business and activities. Once the company is listed,
these intermediaries have to ensure compliance of the issuers supervised by them
with the AIM listing rules. Nomads may also play an important role in corporate
governance decisions, by persuading their clients to align with the best practice
in corporate governance. Nomads act as gatekeepers, advisers and, ultimately,
regulators of AIM-listed companies (Mendoza, 2008). Fast admission processes,
customized oversight and disclosure systems as well as reduced transaction costs
have contributed to the long-term growth of the AIM in terms of issues and capi-
talization.
Until now, empirical works have assessed the survival rates, operating perfor-
mances, and stock returns of the companies listed on the AIM. The conclusions
about the impact of the AIM on the listed firms are mixed (Gregory et al., 2010;
Espenlaub et al., 2012; Vismara et al., 2012; Gerakos et al., 2013; Jenkinson and
Ramadorai, 2013; Nielsson, 2013; for reviews, see Revest and Sapio, 2014 and
Hornok, 2014). More interestingly for our concerns, few empirical works focus on
real performance measures, such as the growth of sales, assets, and productivity
of the listed companies (Cassia et al., 2009, Revest and Sapio, 2013b on AIM).
The growth rate of the listed firms is positively affected by the presence of intan-
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gible assets, the educational level and the experience of the manager (Colombelli,
2010), as well as the quality of the nearby universities (Cassia et al., 2009). The
ability of AIM to nurture the growth of its listed companies has been assessed by
comparing the growth rates of AIM-listed and private manufacturing companies
between 1997 and 2009 (Revest and Sapio, 2013b). The results show that the
AIM selects companies with superior performance in terms of operating revenues
and total assets growth, and that it is able to nurture the growth of employees of
its listed companies. Yet, a negative treatment effect of AIM on productivity is
detected, suggesting that growth in employees is not matched by superior growth
in value added. Toward a wider assessment of the impact of AIM on the real econ-
omy, we choose to turn to another measure, corresponding to one of the original
policy-making goals behind the set up of junior stock markets: the birth rate of
new firms.
2.2 Finance and entry determinants
The literature on firm entry highlights the heterogeneity of entry determinants
(Geroski, 1995; Disney et al., 2003, Bartelsman et al., 2004). Favorable economic
conditions, such as economic growth and high technological opportunities, are
viewed as progressive determinants, while low wages, poor working conditions,
or being unemployed are considered as regressive determinants (Santarelli and
Vivarelli, 2007). Individual determinants play a crucial role, such as experience,
family tradition, financial status, education, gender, age (see for instance Reynolds
et al., 2001; Vivarelli, 2004, among others). Psychological attitudes (desire to be
independent and to attain a better social status, fear to be unemployed, optimism)
are shown to be positively associated to the propensity to become an entrepreneur
(Vivarelli 2004; Astebro et al., 2014, among others). Beside individual determi-
nants, the empirical literature on regional economics sheds light on the importance
of local characteristics that influence firms entry (Armington and Acs, 2002; Shane,
2000).
In addition, the sectoral dimension should also be taken into account: the
entry process is influenced by the sector-specific combinations of technological
opportunities and appropriability and by the sector-specific weight of revolving
door firms (Santarelli and Vivarelli, 2007). More precisely, the state ad dynamics of
an industry affects the entry opportunities. This is suggested by previous evidence
of a multiplier/demonstration effect (Johnson and Parker, 1994; Nystro¨m, 2007),
based on the insight that entry in a sector signals the existence of unexploited
profit opportunities. Entry by a rm might increase the sectoral probability to
attract even more potential entrants. As observed by Geroski (1995), entry comes
in bursts. Entry may also be stimulated by the disappearance of incumbent firms,
according to the replacement effect (Carree and Thurik,1999). Moreover, one
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should expect entry to negatively correlate with past sectoral size, which is a
measure of the contendibility of incumbent positions, consistent with industry life
cycles (e.g. Klepper 1996) and as shown e.g. by Cetorelli and Strahan (2006) or
Castaldi and Sapio (2008).
Access to finance is especially interesting for us among the main determinants
of new business creation. Credit constraints and more generally the lack of finan-
cial resources should limit new firm formation directly, in terms of entry barriers
(Campello 2003), but also indirectly, as they diminish the survival probability and
the rate of growth of new firms, thus discouraging potential entrants (Carpenter
and Petersen, 2002; Becchetti and Trovato, 2002).
The above mentioned results about the main determinants of firms creation
contribute to justify our expectation that a junior stock market may stimulate
firm entry across sectors. The mere existence of a junior stock market may be
interpreted as a favorable economic condition, a progressive determinant, or an
opportunity to enjoy lower financial barriers to entry. The interest in the AIM
as a potential determinant of entry is also in line with the literature on regional
patterns of firm creation (Armington and Acs, 2002). According to Amini et al.
(2010), London-based IPOs have clearly dominated the AIM IPO activity in the
previous years (40% of all IPOs), reflecting the dynamism of the London economy
as compared to other regions.
To sum up, the literature on firm entry offers several indications that a future
entrepreneur may consider, among other pieces of information, measures of IPO
activity, considered as a positive signal stimulating business creation decisions,
despite IPOs being, in absolute terms, a small percentage in the population of
manufacturing firms. The number of IPOs and the money raised could shape the
expectations of an attractive funding environment. Even if a newly created firm
does not plan to go public, stock market activity nevertheless conveys information
on the overall degree of investor confidence. This highlights a peculiar function of
stock exchanges, that shall be discussed next.
2.3 Stock market functions and the AIM
Within the broader research agenda on the real impact of financial markets, Lazon-
ick and O’Sullivan (2004) and Lazonick (2007) have outlined the social conditions
that must be satisfied for firms to collect the strategic, organizational, and financial
resources required for innovation. The authors define five distinct and interrelated
functions performed by the stock market for the innovative firm: creation, control,
combination, compensation, and cash. Creation indicates the ability of the stock
market to encourage the flow of financial resources into new firm formation by
providing a promise of liquidity at a later point in time. Control refers to the
fact that, by affecting the concentration/fragmentation of shareholding, the stock
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market exerts an influence on the relationship between corporate owners and the
managerial staff. Combination concerns the status of corporate stock as currency
in transfers of the strategic control of firms, as in mergers and acquisitions. Com-
pensation concerns the use of corporate stock as remuneration for employees and
managers. Finally, by providing liquidity, the stock market broadens the array of
financial sources available to the listed companies (cash function).1
Depending on the institutional constraints faced by the actors and on macroe-
conomic conditions, the relative weight of the stock market functions vary, as well
as their possible combinations. According to Lazonick and O’Sullivan, the way
these functions combine themselves change over time and orient the market either
towards more speculation or more productive investments.2
At a first glance, junior stock markets do not seem well suited for fully-fledged
performance of the creation function, because of their lesser ability to guarantee
liquidity to its issuers (Vismara et al. 2012). The evidence, however, highlights
junior stock markets as platforms mainly catering to institutional investors inter-
ested in supporting firms that are relatively young and small.
Espenlaub et al. (2012) study post IPO performance and change in ownership
structure and leverage for 195 companies listed in the AIM, and 216 companies
listed on the main market, from 1995 until 1999. The authors show that ownership,
control, and leverage for AIM companies did not change substantially during the
IPO. As companies do not systematically deleverage, the money raised at IPO
appears as an additional financing but not a substitute to debt. In addition, AIM
IPOs issue a smaller percentage of new equity than main market IPOs. Most of
the IPOs on this exchange are offered quasi exclusively to institutional investors
and are equivalent to private placements (Vismara et al., 2012). Out of a total of
1642 IPO on the AIM, 1572 were placements with no shares offered to the public,
the remaining 70 IPOs were hybrid offers. A related mode of operation has been
highlighted for the Canadian junior stock market (Toronto Venture Exchange),
where holding a stake for investors seems to be motivated by the prospect of high
returns, in some cases even higher than from venture capital (Carpentier et al.,
2010).
An alternative reason for focusing on AIM is that the existence of a stock
1The stock market functions outlined here roughly correspond to the functions highlighted
by King and Levine (1993), i.e. revealing the value of the firm and allowing to diversify risk.
2Firm-level case studies have shown that, during the late Nineties, top executives of major US
high-tech corporations supported the speculative strategies of the investors, transforming market
speculation into capital gains through stock options (Lazonick, 2007). Other case studies during
the same period illustrate how, in the pharmaceutical and optical sectors, large innovative firms
have used the stock market in order to perform various functions, such as revenue consolidation
or compensation, most often at the expense of innovation (Mazzucato and Tancioni, 2008; Leaver
and Montalban, 2010).
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market catering to companies unable to reach the Official List modifies the set of
incentives for company sales. The perspective of listing on AIM may increase the
price of a private sale, as it increases the number of potential bidders. A private
company can choose between soliciting private bids and listing on AIM and thus
stimulating more competition for its shares. The expected return for the start-up
financiers would therefore be improved by the presence of AIM. Moreover, AIM
could serve as a show-room for promising high-tech companies that could become
targets of technology acquisitions by large and established companies.
Then, what does the AIM offer to SMEs? Private placements allow the AIM
companies to expand their shareholders base, as compared to the case they remain
private. Moreover, new investors are more likely to introduce cash with the hope
of being able to sell shares in the future, and existing investors feel that they have
an exit opportunity. As Hornok (2014) sums up very well, the main advantage
of the AIM remains that it provides a structured and formal market for liquidity.
The exchange provides finance around the margin both for founders who need
some cash, and allows to enact stock compensation programs, aligning the interest
of employees with the company performance. A company that uses the AIM
may trade in its own stock to grease the market for the benet of its shareholders
(stock repurchase strategies). While the AIM significantly underperforms premier
exchanges with heavier regulation, it bridges the gap between a premier exchange
listing and remaining completely private.
We therefore believe that the creation function described by Lazonick (2007)
can serve as a useful interpretative concept for the performance of junior stock
markets as well.
3 Data and variables
In selecting the data and the variables, we have been guided by the literature
on firm entry and on its financial determinants. The intensity of the creation
function performed by AIM could be assessed by measuring how many new firms
have been created in the whole UK economy because of the sheer presence of
AIM, in comparison with a counterfactual in which the only option available to
potential entrepreneurs was to create a privately-held firm. Such a counterfactual
could be built by comparing data on the birth of new firms before and after
the establishment of AIM, controlling for the time dynamics in all other possible
determinants of rm entry. Yet, shortage of industrial and financial data prior to
1995, the year when AIM was inaugurated, was decisive in pushing us to pursue
another approach: focusing on the time dynamics of entry at the sectoral level of
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disaggregation.3
Indeed, the stock market does not move in all directions at the same speed.
In some sectors, IPOs are more rare; the amount of money raised can also vary,
as firms are highly heterogeneous across sectors as regards their dependence on
external providers of finance. In particular, even a cursory glance at the data
published by the LSE suggests that the extent to which AIM is used for IPOs
varies considerably across industrial sectors. For instance, in the tobacco sector
(NACE Rev. 2 code: 120) between 2002 and 2012 there were no money-raising
IPOs on either AIM or the main market. On the contrary, manufacture of coke
oven products (NACE Rev. 2 code: 191) had 40 money-raising IPOs on AIM in
2005. Money raised at IPO also varies dramatically: for instance, according to
LSE data, in 2005 it ranged from 443.01 million pounds (petroleum products), to
98.85 million pounds (electronic and electrical equipment), to 12 million pounds
(manufacture of beverages) or even lower values.
All this given, let us proceed with the dataset description.
3.1 Sectoral classifications
The selected data come with different sectoral classifications. Amadeus provides
information on the NACE Rev. 2 classification, at both 2 and 4 digits, whereas
the ONS data are classified according to SIC 2007, which is equivalent to NACE.
We however had to face some conversion issues concerning the stock market data,
that are disaggregated according to the Industrial Classication Benchmark (ICB),
devised by FTSE and Dow Jones, from 2006 onwards, and according to an older
FTSE classication until 2005. After a careful examination of the sector definitions,
we have built a correspondence table between the ICB and NACE Rev. 2 sectors,
whereas the old FTSE sectors have been converted into ICB sectors based on
documentation available at the Dow Jones website. Tables 1 and 2, summarizing
these correspondences, are reported in the Appendix. To sum up, stock market
data prior to 2006 have been converted from the old FTSE classication to ICB
sectors and the latter, in turn, into NACE Rev. 2 sectors. NACE Rev. 2 sector
33 was removed, as no correspondence could be found with the ICB codes. Stock
market data for NACE Rev. 2 sectors 13, 14, and 15 were available only from 2006
3Even if data were available, the causal effect of AIM would be difficult to disentangle, because
the AIM is not the first junior market to be created in the UK. The Unlisted Securities Market
(USM) was in operation between 1980 and 1995. Acting as a competitor with other funding
sources for young SMEs, it may have influenced entry decisions as well. Some of the early
AIM-listed companies were actually transfers from the USM, so the overall performances of
AIM and USM were related, at least in the early years. The possible endogeneity of the event
“inauguration of AIM” would have to be treated anyway. If the market was established with the
goal of fostering entry, reverse causality might be an issue.
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onwards.4
3.2 ONS data
The number of new firms in sector s and year t, entrys,t is defined here as the
number of firms that are reported by the Office of National Statistics (ONS) as
births in year t in each sector. This variable allows to focus on de novo firms,
as opposed to the broader concept of entry into an industry, that also accounts
for diversifying entrants. The raw number of entrants is the most obvious candi-
date as dependent variable. Gross entry, i.e. the sheer change in the number of
firms, is less suited to isolating the “genuine” entry of new firms from mergers,
acquisitions, and exits. The ONS also provides data on the numbers of firms in
each sector and on exits. Considering exit, along with entry, can be interesting
as it would provide insights on replacement effects and churning. We also draw,
from the ONS, the change in the output per hour index, available at the NACE
2-digit aggregation level. Growing labour productivity would be seen by potential
entrepreneurs as an encouraging signal, and notably an indicator of expanding
technological opportunities to be tapped.
3.3 LSE data
The LSE website provides measures of stock market activity, the main explanatory
variables of interest in this work. One measure is the number of IPOs on AIM,
by sector. Another measure is the sector-level amount of money raised at IPO on
AIM. This would be a signal of the stock market financing for firms that cannot
access the official list. In addition, we consider the number of small caps listed on
AIM, taking a 5 million pounds capitalization as a threshold.5 These variables are
aggregated by 3-digit NACE Rev. 2 sectors, after conversion from the original ICB
and FTSE classication systems (see Section 3.1 and Appendix). Focusing on only
AIM, however, would hide the possibly relevant impact of the LSE Main Market,
which is arguably more visible and liquid than AIM. Hence, we also use the number
of IPOs and the money raised at IPO on the LSE main market, while the number
of small caps is not considered, as there are no companies with capitalization below
the 5 million pound threshold on the main market.
4A similar concordance problem was faced and solved by Popov and Roosenboom (2013). An
ICB-NACE conversion table had been reported in Ortega-Argiles et al. (2008, Appendix A) but
it refers to the previous revision of the NACE classication (Rev. 1.1) and is more aggregated (2
digits).
5Taking 10 million and 25 million pound thresholds does not change the results in any signif-
icant way. These figures have been computed by using data on the capitalization of individual
stocks at the year end, published by the LSE on its website.
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3.4 Other data sources
Significant partial correlation between entry and the stock market variables may
appear as a result of omitting relevant determinants of entry decisions, related
to alternative funding sources and to the real side of the economy. Alternative
funding sources for potential entrants include venture capital, that can be seen
as a competitor with (or complementary to) AIM for entrepreneurial finance.6
Every year, the annual report of the British Venture Capital Association (BVCA)
publishes the amounts invested by sector of destination, using the ICB classication.
Although these data do not allow to distinguish between different stages, they
still provide a reliable picture of the cross-sectoral patterns of venture capital
investments. Similar to AIM, venture capital investments can be seen as a proxy
for the propensity of institutional investors to finance young and small firms. The
reader is referred to Table 3 (Appendix) for the definitions and notations of all
variables.
[Table 3 here]
3.5 Summary statistics and tests
Table 4 reports summary statistics for all variables used in the econometric anal-
ysis, whereas Table 5 summarizes their time evolution (see Appendix).
[Tables 4 and 5 here]
Table 4 shows that on average, there were more firm exits than entry in the
sample period (159.978 vs. 120.218), presumably because of the post-2008 financial
crisis. The change in output per hour, our productivity measure, was positive on
average (+3.646) but with a very wide range - from -11.3 (manufacturing of motor
vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers, and other transportation equipment in 2009)
to 22.8 (the same sectors in 2010).7 Only 15% of sectors/years have raised money
on the LSE Main Market (see the dummy money raised at IPO on the LSE Main
market), a percentage that grows up to 60.3% for AIM, consistent with its lighter
listing procedures and costs. At the same time, the average amounts of money
raised at IPO on the main market are larger than on the AIM (46.990 million
pounds vs. 28.776). In fact, if we restrict the statistics to only the sectors/years
that feature IPOs (not shown in the table), the minimum of the money raised
6We only have aggregate data on bank loans. Fixed sectoral effects may capture, among other
things, the sector-specific influence of loan supply on new firm formation.
7Other sectors/years in the tails of the productivity change distribution were basic and fab-
ricated metals (-9.3 in 2009) and machinery and equipment (-9.2 in 2009, +19 in 2010).
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distribution on the main market lies above the maximum of the AIM money raised
at IPO. In nearly all of the sectors/years there were venture capital investments
(mean value for the dummy VC invested amounts: 0.929). The number of AIM
small caps in a sector-year was on average 8.265, but with a wide range (between
0 and 87).
In Table 5, one finds that the average number of entrants had two peaks in 2004
and 2008 - and dropped to the lowest in 2010, with a slight increase afterwards.
Exit, too, had a local peak in 2004; then, after a temporary decline, it surged again
to peak in 2009 and then went down again. The change in the output per hour
index was also adversely affected by the crisis, but as with exit, it reacted more
sluggishly than entry to the changed macroeconomic scenario. In 2008, it was still
positive (+2.358), then it collapsed to -3.443 in 2009 and again in 2012 (-3.307).
Concerning equity variables, there are interestingly different time patterns. Money
raised at IPO on either AIM or the LSE Main Market dropped to nearly zero in
2009, although some signs of weakness were already visible in 2008. While the main
market recovered strongly in 2011, the AIM nearly reached an all-time low; both
segments fared poorly in 2012. VC investments, instead, recorded higher levels in
2009-2010 than in 2004-2005, although still very far from the very high amounts
invested in 2006-2007. The number of AIM small caps (with capitalization below
5 million pounds) reached its highest values in 2008 and 2009, and understandably
so, as this was due to stock prices dropping.
4 Empirical methods
We resort to a panel regression in which the unit of observation is sector-year. The
capital raised at IPO on AIM (aims,t) and the number of AIM-listed small caps
(aim.smalls,t) are the variables of interest for our analysis, but we also compare
their effects with those associated with the capital raised at IPO on the LSE main
market (mms,t) and with the value of venture capital investments (vcs,t). Control
variables include the number of entrants, the number of firm exits, the number
of firms. These are meant to capture, respectively, the multiplier/demonstration
effect, the substitution effect, the contendibility of incumbent positions, and tech-
nological opportunities. Sectoral and time effects are denoted by Ds and Dt,
respectively.
In the baseline regressions, we use the 3-year average values of the explanatory
variables. Specifically, we define aims,t−1:3, aim.smalls,t−1:3, mms,t−1:3, vcs,t−1:3 as
follows:
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aims,t−1:3 ≡
1
3
3∑
k=1
aims,t aim.smalls,t−1:3 ≡
1
3
3∑
k=1
aim.smalls,t−k
mms,t−1:3 ≡
1
3
3∑
k=1
mms,t−k vcs,t−1:3 ≡
1
3
3∑
k=1
vcs,t−k
All the other regressors are likewise averaged between t− 1 and t− 3, whereas
labour productivity growth is computed between t−4 and t−1. Control variables
are included in matrix Xs,t−1:3.
The reason why we take 3 lags of the financial market variables is that taking
just a yearly lag may not allow to fully capture their effects, if any. If new entrants
take account of stock market trends, they may not trust short-term signals riddled
with idiosyncratic shocks, and may use longer term information (e.g. the average
activity over several years back; see also Popov and Roosenboom 2013). Also,
creating a new company may be a lengthy process, so that a company incorporated
in year t may have taken its entry decision well before year t − 1. Moreover, as
highlighted by Popov (2009), VC staging may give rise to a measurement error
problem: a single financing round may provide funds to be spent over 2-3 years.
The associated risk of attenuation in the estimated coefficients can be avoided by
aggregating the equity variables over periods longer than 1 year.
Due to the count nature of the dependent variable, entry, and the possible over-
dispersion of the entry counts, the Negative Binomial model is a natural choice:
Prob(entrys,t = y) =
λye−λs,t
y!
(1)
where
λs,t = E[entrys,t|aims,t−1:3, aim.smalls,t−1:3,mms,t−1:3, vcs,t−1:3, Xs,t−1:3, Ds, Dt]
is the expected value of the entry counts, conditional on the explanatory vari-
ables. The variance is given by:
V [entrys,t|aims,t−1:3, aim.smalls,t−1:3,mms,t−1:3, vcs,t−1:3, Xs,t−1:3] = λs,t + σ
2λ2s,t
where σ2 is the variance of an i.i.d. random variable zs,t, such that entrys,t|zs,t ∼
Poisson(λs,tzs,t).
Notice that results from estimating a Poisson model may be inflated, in terms
of magnitude and significance, if sector-years with zero entry are also those with
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no IPOs. We thus prefer to assume a Negative Binomial model and then test for
over-dispersion.
The dependence of λs,t on the explanatory variables is modeled through a log
link, i.e.8
lnλs,t = β0 + βaimaims,t−1:3 + βasaim.smalls,t−1:3 + βmmmms,t−1:3+ (2)
+βvcvcs,t−1:3 +Xs,t−1:3βx + βsDs + βtDt
The Negative Binomial model coefficients in the above specification measure the
marginal response of the (log-)expected entry counts with respect to the regressors.
The underlying assumption is that the effects of the predictors are multiplicative.9
The above model includes unit-specific (i.e. sector-specific) intercepts. Both
Hausman-type and a likelihood-based Breusch-Pagan test suggest to estimate fixed
effect (FE) models. In particular, we estimate one-way FE models, including
sectoral dummies, as well as two-way FE models that include also yearly dummies
and recognize the possible omission of time-varying variables that affect all sectors
alike.10 In all models, the estimation relies on robust standard errors.11
Finding positive coefficients for AIM variables (βaim > 0, βas > 0) would
suggest that sectors relying more on AIM for financing new firms experience more
entry subsequently. Comparing AIM and Main Market coefficients may testify to
the relative strength of their signals to potential entrepreneurs. Since going public
on the main market is a more remote opportunity for young and small firms, we
expect βaim > βmm, i.e. AIM to matter more than the Main Market in guiding
entry.
8The log link allows the predicted values of the expected number of entrants to be nonnegative.
9The Negative Binomial model has the welcome feature that, unlike the log-linear model, is
not affected by the incidental parameters problem (Lancaster, 2000; Neyman and Scott, 1948),
that with the relatively short time length of our panel may be relevant.
10This corresponds to demeaning, an approach that is better than the alternative approach of
first-differencing, because it does not artificially induce serial correlation of the error term. This
also takes care of pro-cyclicality in stock market variables, as in Popov and Roosenboom (2013).
11We lack data that would be useful to build an even richer set of explanatory variables,
e.g. pre-entry experience and the fraction of diversifying entrants (Bayus and Agarwal, 2007),
bank loans (which we can only measure at the aggregate level), as well as some more nuanced
measures of entry barriers, such as advertising/sales ratios or the statistical properties of the size
distribution of incumbents. Variables sometimes used in cross-country studies on financial depth
and entry, such as employee protection, ring costs, and the unemployment rate, instead, would
not be relevant in our single-country analysis.
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5 Results
Baseline estimates, as well as various robustness exercises, are illustrated in this
section.
5.1 Baseline results
Table 6 summarizes the results of estimating the negative binomial model of sec-
toral entry, using only sectoral fixed effects (column i) or sectoral and time fixed
effects (col. ii). Reported in the tables are the elasticities estimated at the mean
of the explanatory variables, along with their respective standard errors and over-
dispersion tests when applicable.
[Table 6 here]
The impact of the capital raising variables differs across sources (aim, mm, vc)
in sign and magnitude, although one would expect similar effects from segments of
the same stock exchange and venture capital industry, that tend to move together
along the business cycle. The elasticity of entry with respect to aim is about
9.4% in the 1-way FE model (9.2% with 2-way FE) and statistically significant.
The number of AIM small caps has a positive effect, and a significant one in the
Poisson 2-way FE model (a 17% elasticity). Quite surprisingly, the effect of main
market IPOs is negative and significant, corresponding to a -5.9% elasticity. There
is a negative effect of VC investments, but not a robust one in significance terms.
Concerning control variables, we observe positive autocorrelation in entry counts,
suggesting a multiplier/demonstration effect. We also find a replacement effect:
lagged exit significantly affects entry. Expectedly, the coefficients associated to
the number of firms and to productivity growth are, respectively, negative and
positive, and significant in both cases.
In col. iii we repeat the Negative Binomial estimates by including all three lags
of the capital raising variables, with the goal of uncovering time patterns in their
influence, which may help explaining the opposite effects of main market and AIM
activity. AIM IPO proceeds become significant from the second lag on, whereas
aim.small only does so from the third lag on. The effect of main market activity,
instead, does not stretch back as far: it is significant (and negative) only at the
first and second lag. Further differences between AIM and the main market are
thus highlighted, as if the two segments conveyed different pieces of information to
potential entrepreneurs. We investigate this intuition further, by using alternative
measures of stock market activity, namely the number of money-raising IPOs on
the AIM and on the main market, as well as the number of VC deals (the first
three lags of all these variables). The number of IPOs is often considered as an
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indicator for hot market conditions. Consistent with the insight from the previous
estimates, col. iv shows that the effect of main market IPOs dries out after two
lags, whereas the number of AIM small caps (and now, also the number of VC
deals) exercise positive effects on longer lags.
For the sake of comparison, we also report estimates of Poisson (col. v) and log-
linear models (col. vi), using 2-way fixed effects. In the Poisson case, capital raising
signs are confirmed, but the coefficients to mm and aim.small lose significance.
The demonstration effect and the negative effect of sectoral size are confirmed, with
lower magnitudes, whereas the replacement and productivity effect lose ground.
Log-linear estimates fail to capture the effects observed through count models,
although the elasticity of entry with respect to aim.small is significant and equal
to nearly 7%.
5.2 Dealing with data issues
Some of the data measurement strategies we have used may be questionable. As
always with econometrics, the set of available explanatory variables may not fully
overlap with the variables a theorist has in mind. One such issue is the decision
to focus on a 3-year horizon in order to assess the effects of interest. In some
sectors, entry decisions may react more promptly to the signals coming from stock
markets; in others it may take more time, if any. Hence it is worth checking how
the results would change if we focused on a longer (4 years) or shorter horizon (1
and 2 years).
We thus replace the main market, AIM, and VC variables in the baseline
specification of the 2-way FE Negative Binomial models with the amounts of
capital raised by each sector in the 1, 2, or 4 years before, i.e. 1
p
∑p
k=1 aims,t,
1
p
∑p
k=1 aim.smalls,t−k,
1
p
∑p
k=1mms,t−k, and
1
p
∑p
k=1 vcs,t−k, with alternatively p =
1, p = 2, p = 4. We similarly replace lagged entry, exit, and the number of firms
with their averages over 1, 2, and 4 years before. Productivity growth is recom-
puted as the change over the same spells in the output-per-hour index published
by the ONS.12
[Table 7 here]
Shorter lags allow to obtain less distinctive results, as expected (Table 7, col. i
and ii). Capital raised at IPO on AIM has positive elasticities (less than 1% in the
1-year horizon model, 4.5% in the 2-year horizon case), that are significant only
in the 2-year horizon estimates. The number of AIM small caps is not significant,
12When estimating the model on shorter lags, we nevertheless use the same sample as in the
3-year horizon estimates, i.e. the earliest entry observations refer to 2005. We wish to avoid
these new results to be driven by unobserved factors that were specific of years before 2005.
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nor is venture capital; whereas capital raised at IPO in the main market displays
negative and significant elasticities.
In addition to the above results, the significant multiplier/demonstration effect
is confirmed (related to positive and significant lagged entry coefficients). There
is a positive replacement effect, losing significance over the 1-year horizon. The
negative effect of the number of firms is confirmed, whereas the positive elastic-
ity of entry with respect to the growth of labour productivity is not statistically
significant.
In the 4-years horizon case (col. iii), the elasticity of entry with respect to the
capital raised at IPO on AIM is equal to 12.3%, whereas the effects of AIM small
caps, main market capital raised at IPO, and venture capital lose significance.
Lagged entry, the lagged number of firms, and labour productivity growth enter
significantly, whereas no significant replacement effect is detected in this case.
By performing the main estimates on 3- and 4-year lags, we indirectly had
taken care of an additional issue with the previous estimates. Indeed, the sign
and significance of the coefficients attached to IPO proceeds in shorter horizons
may be driven by the presence of zeros, and so they may conflate an extensive
margin effect - due to the sheer presence of IPOs - with an intensive margin effect,
according to which what stimulates entry is the amount of money raised at IPO.
Yet, the percentage of sectors-years that launched IPOs on the LSE Main Market
over a 4 years time span was 74.5%, and 97.6% on AIM; 99.1% of sector-years
received venture capital. Hence, the coefficients based on longer horizons can be
seen as mainly capturing an intensive margin effect.
Nonetheless, we repeat the estimates of the baseline model (2-way FE, 3-year
horizon) while replacing aim, mm, and vc by means of dummies taking unit val-
ues whenever there was a positive amount of raised capital, and zero otherwise.
Coefficients associated to these variables convey information on the extensive mar-
gin effect of stock market listing and venture capital. Consistent with the above
insight, the estimates, reported in Table 7 (col. iv), show that the extensive mar-
gin effect lacks statistical significance. The baseline estimates, thus, can be taken
as measuring the intensive margin effect on entry of capital raised on the stock
market.
Next, baseline results may have been biased if sectors with larger IPO proceeds
are also those with more entry, since the pool of potential IPO firms is fed by the
process of firm creation itself. Hence we remove the sectors with the highest and
the lowest raised capital at IPO on AIM between 2002 and 2012 (namely, NACE
192 Manufacture of refined petroleum products and NACE 120 Manufacture of
tobacco products, respectively). In col. v the baseline results are largely confirmed,
although with slightly weaker elasticities with respect to AIM capital raised (a 5.7%
elasticity now) and AIM small caps (15.4%).
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5.3 Omitted variables and endogeneity
Models such as the above, despite the use of fixed effects, are unable to properly
deal with the omitted variables bias. Omitting non-observed or non-observable
variables that affect firm creation decisions would induce correlation between the
stock market variables and the error term. One cure for this problem is the pseudo
diff-in-diff approach pioneered by Rajan and Zingales (1998), that includes interac-
tion terms in order to take care of sector-time effects. Our capital raising variables
(mm, aim, vc) are hereby interacted with a measure of entry barriers, i.e. the
sectoral averages of the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, built from Amadeus data on
UK manufacturing companies for the period 1997-2009. A similar approach was
followed by Popov and Roosenboom (2013), who used US sectoral entry rates to
proxy entry barriers in a relatively frictionless economy. This exercise is also in
line with Beck et al. (2005), who explored the growth-enhancing properties of
financial expansion in sectors that rely more on small firms. We depart from the
Rajan-Zingales approach of taking the US as a benchmark, because the UK is
already one of the countries with the most frictionless stock markets in the world.
In Table 8, 2-way FE Negative Binomial with 3 lags are augmented with inter-
action terms. AIM raised capital keeps affecting entry, but only in its stand-alone
version (with an elasticity of 8.4% with respect to capital raised, and 17% to small
caps), whereas capital raised through main market IPOs loses its significance. The
AIM effect, however, is not channeled through interaction terms, whose coefficients
lack significance. The main message from the baseline estimates is confirmed.
[Table 8 here]
The analysis performed so far could also be criticized on the grounds of reverse
causality: it could be entry that drives IPOs and not the opposite. Arguably, there
can hardly be IPOs in sectors where entry is rare. Regulatory and technological
barriers that deter entry, thus, constrain the pool of potential IPOs. Moreover,
firms in concentrated sectors may rather look at the main market as the venue for
IPO financing, as they are characterized by relatively large efficient scale at entry
and thus can afford to bear the higher costs of an official listing. It is worth noting
that low barriers make entry easier, but this need not translate into more IPOs
if the fixed component of quotation costs is disproportionally born by smaller
and younger firms. Also, whereas IPOs are more rare in concentrated sectors,
the average amount of money raised per IPO in those sectors is supposed to be
relatively large, reflecting a larger firm size. In fact, we do control for main market
activity, for the past number of entrants, and for the size of the sectors in the
regressions. We have already shown (Table 6, col. v) that our results hold even
after excluding sectors with the highest and lowest IPO proceeds. Sectors with less
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entry today will probably have less IPOs tomorrow, but sectors with more entry
today need not have more IPOs tomorrow - casting doubts on reverse causation.
Nonetheless, we implement an estimator based on instrumental variables and
attempt to identify the causal effect of our financial variables. Besides the AIM
IPO proceeds, VC investments could also be considered as endogenous for very
similar reasons. Main market IPOs, instead, are hardly endogenous with respect
to the rates of new business creation, since the official listing requirements are
typically unattainable by infant firms.
In order to take care of the endogeneity of aim and vc, we need instrumental
variables that are correlated with capital raising on AIM and through VC, but not
with the error term of the firm creation equation, that can be seen as collecting
the unobserved component of entrepreneurial opportunities. More specifically, we
know that new firm creation increases the demand for funding, which is why aim
and vc could be endogenous. Hence, for the identification of the causal effects we
need to consider exogenous variation in the supply of funding. Some papers have
used lagged values of the endogenous variable to this end, but in our case longer
lags of vc and aim may still be correlated with entrepreneurial opportunities (see
Sections 4, 5.1 and 5.2 for a discussion on this point). Hence we follow Popov and
Roosenboom (2013) and works cited therein and use instrumental variables based
on buyout assets and the size of pension funds (data source: Eurostat). Indeed,
both buyout fund-raising and pension funds measure the spending capacity of
institutional investors, who are key in both VC and AIM.
We generate three instrumental variables. The first is buyout fund-raising in-
teracted with the sectoral shares of VC investments (with respect to total annual
VC). Buyout fund-raising is an aggregate variable, hence interacting it with sec-
toral VC shares allows to provide a rough estimate of how much buyout assets
would be potentially available to each sectors. We take the 3-years lag of this
interaction term.
The second variable is the size of pension funds, as a ratio of GDP, interacted
with the sectoral amounts of VC before the adoption of the pension funds direc-
tive by the European Commission in 2003, and with a dummy equal to 1 after
the adoption (cf. Popov and Roosenboom 2013). The idea is that after this di-
rective, the UK, which had liberalized years before, became a potential market
for investments by pension funds in other EU countries. The third variable is the
size of pension funds, as a ratio of GDP, times the sectoral amounts of AIM IPO
proceeds before the amendments to the stamp duty regime of ETFs in 2007, which
enhanced the possibility of non-UK European issuers to list on AIM (see interview
to LSE official Gillian Walmsley for Morningstar, 20 July, 2010); times a dummy
equal to 1 from 2007 on.
The insight behind the two latter IVs is that risky investments, such as those
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in VC and in AIM-listed companies, should attract more financing if pension funds
are larger, but more so in sectors that attracted VC and AIM IPOs even before
the reforms, and taking account that liberalization events allowed the UK market
to be targeted by a larger “audience”. Caveats on the two latter instruments are
discussed in Popov and Roosenboom (2013) on VC, and similar remarks can be
made on AIM.
Our firm creation model is a Negative Binomial model. In case one or more re-
gressors are suspected of endogeneity, Wooldridge (2002) and Terza et al. (2008)
suggest using the two-stage residual inclusion (2SRI) method to identify causal
effects. In the first stage, the possibly endogenous variables are regressed on the
excluded and included instruments. In the second stage, the non-linear model at
hand (in our case, Negative Binomial) is estimated by including the first-stage
residuals along with all regressors (both exogenous and endogenous). First-stage
residuals, indeed, approximate for the unobservable variable that is supposed to
jointly cause the outcome variable and the endogenous regressors. The number
of IVs must be no less than the number of endogenous regressors, and the usual
criteria (instrument relevance, exclusion restriction) must be satisfied. In the sec-
ond stage, standard errors need to be corrected, e.g. by means of bootstrapping.13
Exogeneity of aim and vc can be tested by means of a joint F-test on the coeffi-
cients associated to the first-stage residuals in the second-stage equation. The null
is that all those coefficients are jointly zero.
In Table 9 we report the estimates from the 2SRI procedure: the two left-most
columns include the first-stage results (assuming, respectively, AIM IPO capital
raised and VC proceeds as endogenous variables), whereas the right-most column
reports the second-stage results. The joint F-test on the instruments coefficients
in the first-stage regressions confirm the relevance of the instruments: in the AIM
equation, the F(3,429) statistic is 19.76 (p-value: 0.000); F(3,429) = 26.71 in the
VC equation (p-value = 0.0000). Correlations between the instruments and the
second-stage Pearson error term are negligible, as shown in the bottom-right of
the table, motivating us to believe in the exclusion restriction. Our choice of
instrumental variables is in line with the usual requirements. Though, it is worth
noting that the coefficients attached to the first-stage residuals in the second-stage
equation are not statistically significant. Hence, we can conclude that capital raised
at IPO on AIM and that VC investments are exogenous with respect to sectoral
entry counts. Consequently, the estimates obtained in the previous subsections
can be seen as measuring the causal effects of capital raising on sectoral entry.14
In Table 10, the 2SRI estimates are repeated, but this time we use as financial
variables the IPO and VC investment counts instead of their monetary values.
13See however Wooldridge (2002) for an exact computation of standard errors.
14Similar results obtain if we include instrumental variables one at a time.
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The previous results are confirmed: again, the three instruments are relevant, as
they are significantly correlated with both the possibly endogenous variables; in
the second stage, the first-stage residuals display non-significant coefficients; the
second-stage residuals are nearly uncorrelated with the outcome variable.
[Tables 9 and 10 here]
5.4 Summary and discussion of results
Our results suggest that entry decisions take account of stock market information
even though, in all likelihood, very few firms plan to ever go public. Sectors that
raise more capital at IPO on AIM are also those housing more entrants in sub-
sequent years, ceteris paribus, whereas sectors raising more capital through main
market IPOs are characterized, on the margin, by less new entrants. We can give
a causal interpretation to these results, since our tests indicate that capital raised
through AIM and VC are exogenous with respect to entrepreneurial opportunities.
The negative association between new firm formation and main market IPOs
is a surprising result that can be interpreted in two (not mutually exclusive) ways,
possibly throwing light on the role of AIM in firm creation, too.
One interpretation is that in more “financialized” sectors, incumbents compete
more aggressively, thereby preventing entry or harshly responding to it. Consider
listed companies where ownership and control are separated and the managers
are instructed to maximize shareholders value, but are imperfectly monitored.
Rotemberg and Scharfstein (1990) showed that a firm can boost its stock price
- and thereby its shareholders value - by competing aggressively on the product
market: indeed, this is a way to enhance its profitability and to cause the rivals’
performance to fall, an information that would be incorporated in higher stock
prices. Kraus and Rubin (2010) build a theoretical model through which they
conclude that the higher the shareholders diversification, the higher the propen-
sity of managers to initiate “cannibalistic projects that decrease their rivals’ market
shares, as opposed to “economy-increasing” projects that would instead open up
entry opportunities. The empirical analysis in Khanna and Tice (2000) showed
that privately-held incumbents and those with higher inside ownership in the de-
partment store industry reacted more aggressively to entry by Wal-Mart. One
implication is that listed incumbents would manage to sustain their stock prices
by limiting entry.
Ownership-control separation is mandated by corporate governance rules for
listed companies, specifically in the London Stock Exchange main market, but not
for AIM-listed companies. An industry that relies more on stock market financing
is therefore also an industry in which more companies adopt the “best practice”
governance structure and suffer from the associated agency issues. No discrepancy
between shareholders value maximization and profit maximization ought to occur
outside of the stock market. Hence, less main market IPOs in an industry implies
lower incentives for incumbents to compete aggressively. If so, more entry should
be observed in industries that rely less on the main market, all else being given.
As said, such financialization incentives are expected to be weaker among AIM-
listed companies. Although Nomads may advice to adopt the standard governance,
that is not mandatory. In AIM-listed companies, management and ownership can
coincide, let alone that most of their shares are held by institutional investors and
are not actively traded (see Vismara et al. 2012). The relatively higher involvement
of institutional investors in the capital of AIM-listed companies, moreover, could
make them more inclined to adopt option-based compensation schemes, thereby
mitigating the incentives for managers to use cannibalization as a threat against
potential entrants (Kraus and Rubin 2010).
Another story is that potential entrants face higher financial barriers to entry in
sectors that rely more on stock market funding, especially if access to stock markets
is limited. This is rooted in the negative association between product market entry
and concentration among financiers, previously observed in the literature mainly
with respect to banking competition (see e.g. Campello 2003). That evidence may
be relevant for stock market financing too. Indeed, listing requirements set by
the main market effectively reduce the access to finance, as smaller and younger
firms can only rely on loans or private equity if they do not have enough own
funding. This cannot be said about AIM, wherein listing requirements ultimately
are tailored by Nomads in a case-wise fashion. What is less convincing about this
story is that stock market listing need not be the primary financial source of choice
for newcomers - and indeed, it is not, as shown by the evidence on the pecking
order hypothesis (Myers 1984). Even in market-based financial systems, however,
what constrains entry and growth is the lack of internal funds; external financial
constraints (mainly related to credit) are binding only at a later stage of a firm’s
life (see Dosi et al. 2016). The latter explanation is related to the possible joint
causation of entry barriers and stock market financing. This has been already
explored are taken care of through the 2SRI method (Tables 9 and 10) and the
estimates on a sample excluding sectors with large IPO proceeds (Table 7, col. v).
Where is venture capital in this picture? The venture capital coefficient is
only significant with a positive sign in our estimates when we consider the num-
ber of deals. The value of VC disbursements does not seem to be relevant in
entrepreneurial decisions. Perhaps, data on the size of venture capital deals are
less transparent than stock market data; alternatively, prospective firm founders
know that the size of venture capital deals is a poor proxy for the overall value of
venture capital, which includes advice on governance, technological, and commer-
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cial matters. This is only apparently contrasting with Popov and Roosenboom’s
(2013) results. Their analysis focused on a cross-section including countries with
dramatic differences in terms of venture capital development. By focusing on just
one country, it is likely that venture capital affects most sectors alike.
One limitation of our analysis relates to the lack of debt data at the sectoral
level. We have partly accounted for this omission by using sectoral and time fixed
effects, as well as through the pseudo diff-in-diff method. The trend in banking
deregulation has apparently magnified both entrepreneurship and business closures
(Bertrand et al. 2007; Kerr and Nanda 2009). At the same time, the behaviors
of banks during the crisis in the UK may have changed the appetite for equity
as compared to debt capital. On a broader note, it must be remarked that the
UK has experienced a growing amount of credit in the period of interest, but
not a monotonic trend in new firm formation. The hint in the available statistical
information is that bank-based financing has satisfied mainly the needs of large and
established companies. UK statistics show that in the last decade, credit trends
display different dynamics according to firm size (Monteiro, 2013). Especially
lending to SMEs has been characterized by a continued retraction from 2004 until
2012, meanwhile between 2004 and 2008, and between 2010 and 2012, credit flows
oriented toward larger corporate firms were increasing. So, our results would
probably survive to including sectoral credit data.
6 Conclusion
In the years under examination, 2004-2012, a period characterized by the emer-
gence and subsequent crash of the subprime bubble, the AIM seems to have per-
formed a creation function for UK manufacturing firms. All things being equal,
sectors that raised more capital at IPO on AIM and with more AIM-listed small
caps were also those housing more new entrants in the subsequent years. The mag-
nitude of this effect increases as the amounts of raised capital are aggregated over
longer time horizons, and is stronger than for alternative financing sources, such
as IPOs on the LSE Main Market and VC investments. Our robustness checks
show that this statistical relationship captures an intensive margin effect, i.e. the
effect is related to more IPO proceeds, not to more IPOs; and it is not driven by
a few sectors that rely on very large IPOs. The results are robust when we con-
trol for an omitted variables bias through pseudo diff-in-diff estimates, interacting
capital raised with market concentration indices, and when we allow for exogenous
variation in the supply of finance from institutional investors, through a 2-stage
residual inclusion method.
All is not well with the real effects of financial markets, though. The celebrated
hero of startup finance, venture capital, is not systematically associated with entry
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in our sample, possibly reflecting the flow of venture capital finance towards sectors
with lower entry opportunities, as already observed in previous periods (see Mur-
ray, 1999; Jeng and Wells, 2000; Mayer et al., 2005 and the discussion in Revest
and Sapio, 2012). In this latter respect, our results question the beneficial effect
of VC theorized by Michelacci and Suarez (2004) in their recycling hypothesis and
estimated by Popov and Roosenboom (2013), who however used a cross-country
sample.
Quite surprisingly, more capital raised at IPO in the main market does not
translate into a greater flow of new firms, possibly because financialized incum-
bents, under ownership-control separation, have incentives to compete fiercely in
order to sustain their stock prices.
As suggested by our results, the relative illiquidity of a junior listing venue such
as AIM is not, as such, a limiting factor with respect to providing signals for new
firm formation, despite previous evidence highlighting the opacity and speculative
behaviors typical of this listing venue (see e.g. the debate on the survival rates
in Espenlaub et al., 2012 and Gerakos et al., 2013), and the unsatisfactory real
and financial performances of AIM-listed firms (see for instance the results on the
declining labour productivity by Revest and Sapio, 2013b). The number of small
caps and the amounts of raised capital on the junior stock market may have been
taken as indicators by prospective firm founders, helping mitigate the uncertainty
faced in launching their entrepreneurial activities. Yet, this does not mean that
junior markets are able to provide reliable estimates of the fundamental value of
the listed shares. Rather, the risk is that founders and managers of new firms
place much too weight on market value in their decision processes. The number
of entrants can be inflated by false expectations, disconnected from the real value
of the existing firms. Fostering entry is, after all, a necessary but not sufficient
condition for generating highly-skilled, innovative jobs.
In line with the literature on economic geography, an interesting future direc-
tion of research would be to focus on the regional level of firm formation. Does the
influence of AIM on firms birth rates differs according to the region concerned?
Are the more active industrial sectors in the firms creation located in London and
in the south-eastern region? This may extend works on the influence of VC on
entry across regions (Mollica and Zingales 2007; Samila and Sorenson 2011).
On a final note, our econometric approach implicitly assumes that public and
private equity are substitutes. Carpentier et al. (2010) offered an example of this,
as the Toronto Stock Exchange Venture market, dedicated to micro-cap firms at
a pre-revenue stage, was found to offer comparable returns to investors as VC.
Yet, future research may need to develop econometric models able to account
for the dual relationship between private and public equity, which can be viewed
as complementary (stock market quotation is a possible exit route for venture
25
capitalists, see e.g. Jeng and Wells 2000) or substitutes (junior markets and VC
funds may target the same firm types), and thus provide new answers to the
question posed by Black and Gilson (1999) on stock market activity as a pre-
requisite for developed venture capital industries.
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Table 1: Correspondence table: NACE Rev. 2, ICB, FTSE.
NACE Rev. 2 ICB FTSE
100 Manufacture of food products 3570 43
110 Manufacture of beverages 3530 41
120 Manufacture of tobacco products 3780 49
160 Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except furniture; 1730 15
manufacture of articles of straw and plaiting materials
171 Manufacture of pulp, paper and paperboard ” ”
172 Manufacture of articles of paper and paperboard 3720 47
180 Printing and reproduction of recorded media 5550 54
191 Manufacture of coke oven products 1770 4
192 Manufacture of refined petroleum products 530 7
200 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 1350 11
210 Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical preparations 4570 48
221 Manufacture of rubber products 3350 31
222 Manufacture of plastic products 3720 47
230 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 2350 13
240 Manufacture of basic metals 1750 18
251 Manufacture of structural metal products 2350 13
252 Manufacture of tanks, reservoirs and containers of metal 3720 47
253 Manufacture of steam generators, except central heating hot water boilers 2750 26
254 Manufacture of weapons and ammunition 2710 21
255 Forging, pressing, stamping and roll-forming of metal; powder metallurgy 1750 18
256 Treatment and coating of metals; machining ” ”
257 Manufacture of cutlery, tools and general hardware 3720 47
259 Manufacture of other fabricated metal products 2350 13
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Table 2: Correspondence table: NACE Rev. 2, ICB, FTSE (continued).
NACE Rev. 2 ICB FTSE
261 Manufacture of electronic components and boards 2730 25
262 Manufacture of computers and peripheral equipment 9570 93
263 Manufacture of communication equipment ” ”
264 Manufacture of consumer electronics 3740 34
265 Manufacture of instruments and appliances for measuring, 2730 25
testing and navigation; watches and clocks
266 Manufacture of irradiation, electromedical and electrotherapeutic equipment 4530 44
267 Manufacture of optical instruments and photographic equipment 4530 44
270 Manufacture of electrical equipment 2730 25
280 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 2750 26
290 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 3350 31
301 Building of ships and boats 2750 26
302 Manufacture of railway locomotives and rolling stock ” ”
303 Manufacture of air and spacecraft and related machinery 2710 21
309 Manufacture of transport equipment n.e.c. 3350 31
310 Manufacture of furniture 3720 34
322 Manufacture of musical instruments 3740 53
323 Manufacture of sports goods ” ”
324 Manufacture of games and toys ” ”
325 Manufacture of medical and dental instruments and supplies 4530 44
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Table 3: Summary statistics of the variables used in the econometric analysis.
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Entry 814 122.039 263.96 0 2640
Exit 814 165.424 387.708 0 3720
Number of firms 814 1862.383 4433.417 0 35840
Output per hour, annual rate of growth (%) 814 2.881 5.870 -13.6 22.8
Money raised at IPO, AIM (million pounds) 814 28.776 56.053 0 443.01
Money raised at IPO, LSE Main Market (million pounds) 814 46.990 288.020 0 7036.58
Venture capital invested amounts (million pounds) 814 103.085 200.712 0 2890
Money raised at IPO, AIM (dummy) 814 .603 .490 0 1
Money raised at IPO, LSE Main Market (dummy) 814 .150 .357 0 1
Venture capital invested amounts (dummy) 814 .929 .257 0 1
Number of AIM small caps (cap. < 5 million pounds) 814 8.265 9.129 0 87
Table 4: Time evolution of the variables used in the econometric analysis: annual
averages across manufacturing sectors between 2004 and 2012.
Year Entry Exit N. of firms Output per h., M. raised M. raised VC invest. N. AIM
annual change IPO, MM IPO, AIM small caps
(mill. GBP) (mill. GBP) (mill. GBP)
2004 176.960 218.446 2207.568 6.396 60.218 41.461 71.965 6.551
2005 162.905 194.662 2158.986 3.897 151.906 50.574 68.696 8.764
2006 144.189 169.662 2117.230 4.812 29.561 87.383 260.867 8.702
2007 152.095 174.460 2098.986 4.286 56.186 53.830 464.102 8.702
2008 171.892 210.338 2514.257 2.358 15.094 23.396 86.091 14.646
2009 145.473 247.905 2513.784 -3.443 .837 .568 93.977 9.108
2010 128.446 224.324 2397.297 4.500 41.063 33.052 99.160 5.972
2011 130.473 190.135 2264.865 2.180 100.221 7.896 80.306 6.782
2012 130 189.730 2213.243 -3.307 2.222 6.644 51.865 6.918
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Table 5: Nomenclature.
Symbols Definitions Data sources
s NACE Rev. 2 sector (see Tables 1 and 2)
t Year
entrys,t Firm births ONS
exits,t Firm deaths ONS
ns,t Number of firms ONS
∆ophs,t−1:p Change in output per hour between years t− p and t− 1 ONS
aims,t Money raised at IPO on AIM LSE
aim.smalls,t Number of AIM-listed firms with capitalization < 5 million GBP own comput. on LSE
mms,t Money raised at IPO on the LSE Main Market LSE
vcs,t Venture capital amounts invested by sector of destination BVCA
xs,t−p
1
p
∑p
k=1 xs,t−k
where x ∈ {entry, exit, n, aim, aim.small,mm, vc} own computation
HHIs Herfindahl-Hirschman index, average between 1997 and 2009 own comput. on Amadeus
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Table 6: NegBin, Poisson, and log-linear models of entry; one-way and two-way FE estimators.
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
entrys,t, NegBin entrys,t, NegBin entrys,t, NegBin entrys,t, NegBin entrys,t, Poisson log(entrys,t), OLS
elast. elast. elast. elast. elast. elast.
(logs)
entrys,t−1:3 0.321*** (5.73) 0.282*** (5.17) 0.265*** (4.47) 0.286*** (5.10) 0.163*** (3.31) 0.865*** (11.86)
exits,t−1:3 0.170** (2.26) 0.101 (1.35) 0.153* (1.75) 0.159* (1.88) 0.0895 (1.35) -0.267* (-1.81)
ns,t−1:3 -0.401*** (-3.82) -0.279*** (-2.65) -0.326*** (-2.78) -0.359*** (-3.03) -0.204** (-2.11) 0.243 (1.29)
∆ophs,t−1:4 0.0856*** (4.78) 0.0346* (1.67) 0.0357* (1.67) 0.0384* (1.80) 0.0196 (0.87) 0.00197 (0.82)
(logs)
mms,t−1:3 -0.0325** (-2.23) -0.0569*** (-3.65) -0.0127 (-0.77) -0.00799 (-0.21)
aims,t−1:3 0.0939*** (3.13) 0.0919*** (3.03) 0.0755*** (2.67) 0.0330 (0.78)
vcs,t−1:3 -0.0232 (-1.21) -0.0190 (-1.01) -0.0175 (-1.30) -0.00682 (-0.26)
aim.smalls,t−1:3 -0.000836 (-0.01) 0.172*** (2.61) 0.107 (1.53) 0.0686* (1.92)
(IPO value) (IPO counts)
mms,t−1 -0.0252*** (-3.35) -0.0237** (-2.34)
mms,t−2 -0.0234*** (-2.78) -0.0204* (-1.74)
mms,t−3 -0.00425 (-0.57) -0.00335 (-0.29)
aims,t−1 0.0212 (1.55) 0.0282 (1.19)
aims,t−2 0.0489*** (3.55) 0.0517 (1.47)
aims,t−3 0.0365*** (2.85) -0.00292 (-0.12)
(VC value) (VC counts)
vcs,t−1 -0.0154 (-1.61) -0.0443 (-1.11)
vcs,t−2 -0.00734 (-0.84) 0.0730* (1.67)
vcs,t−3 0.00831 (0.73) 0.119*** (3.17)
aim.smalls,t−1 -0.00804 (-0.15) -0.0510 (-0.97)
aim.smalls,t−2 -0.0254 (-0.49) 0.0125 (0.24)
aim.smalls,t−3 0.200*** (3.14) 0.216*** (3.22)
Constant -0.235 (-0.33)
Sector FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time FE no yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 518 518 518 518 518 518
t statistics in parentheses. Legend: see Table 5.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 7: Negative Binomial models of entry: two-way FE estimator accounting for various data issues.
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
1-year horiz. 2-year horiz. 4-year horiz. Extens. marg. Trimming
elast. elast. elast. elast. elast.
entrys,t−1 0.241*** (4.28)
exits,t−1 0.0425 (0.84)
ns,t−1 -0.152** (-2.10)
∆ophs,t−1:2 0.00505 (0.56)
mms,t−1 -0.0260*** (-3.59)
aims,t−1 0.00879 (0.63)
vcs,t−1 -0.00584 (-0.70)
aim.smalls,t−1 -0.00805 (-0.14)
entrys,t−1:2 0.274*** (5.20)
exits,t−1:2 0.0852* (1.72)
ns,t−1:2 -0.240*** (-3.44)
∆ophs,t−1:3 0.0166 (1.18)
mms,t−1:2 -0.0407*** (-3.91)
aims,t−1:2 0.0450** (2.19)
vcs,t−1:2 -0.0131 (-1.04)
aim.smalls,t−1:2 0.0388 (0.53)
entrys,t−1:4 0.277*** (3.68)
exits,t−1:4 0.124 (1.23)
ns,t−1:4 -0.343** (-2.45)
∆ophs,t−1:5 0.0575* (1.73)
mms,t−1:4 -0.0317 (-1.37)
aims,t−1:4 0.123** (2.41)
vcs,t−1:4 -0.00137 (-0.04)
aim.smalls,t−1:4 0.0825 (0.74)
entrys,t−1:3 0.315*** (5.81) 0.306*** (5.42)
exits,t−1:3 0.0861 (1.24) 0.106 (1.41)
ns,t−1:3 -0.294*** (-3.03) -0.305*** (-2.86)
∆ophs,t−1:4 0.0614*** (2.85) 0.0425** (2.07)
mms,t−1:3 > 0 0.00681 (0.32)
aims,t−1:3 > 0 -0.0640 (-1.21)
vcs,t−1:3 > 0 0.0125 (0.01)
aim.smalls,t−1:3 0.0532 (0.71) 0.154** (2.36)
mms,t−1:3 -0.0476*** (-3.12)
aims,t−1:3 0.0572* (1.73)
vcs,t−1:3 -0.0151 (-0.77)
Sector FE yes yes yes yes yes
Time FE yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 592 592 444 518 504
t statistics in parentheses. Legend: see Table 5.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 8: Pseudo diff-in-diff estimates of the Negative Binomial model of entry.
elast.
entrys,t−1:3 0.2730*** (4.94)
exits,t−1:3 0.0927 (1.22)
ns,t−1:3 -0.2640** (-2.43)
∆ophs,t−1:4 0.0370* (1.77)
mms,t−1:3 -0.0337 (-1.10)
aims,t−1:3 0.0843* (1.70)
vcs,t−1:3 -0.0257 (-0.81)
aim.smalls,t−1:3 0.1710*** (2.60)
mms,t−1:3 ∗HHIs -0.0259 (-0.61)
aims,t−1:3 ∗HHIs 0.0025 (0.04)
vcs,t−1:3 ∗HHIs 0.0087 (0.18)
Sector FE yes
Time FE yes
Observations 518
t statistics in parentheses. Legend: see Table 5.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 9: 2-Stage Residual Inclusion estimates of the Negative Binomial model of entry.
1st stage, AIM IPO m. raised 1st stage, VC invest. 2nd stage
aims,t−1:3 vcs,t−1:3 entrys,t
elast. elast. elast.
entrys,t−1:3 .0030*** (2.70) -.0006 (-0.16) .2579*** (3.78)
exits,t−1:3 .0006 (0.44 -.0060 (-1.21) .0927 (1.14)
ns,t−1:3 -.0002 (-1.20) .0007 (1.26) -.2534 (-1.94)
∆ophs,t−1:4 .0145* (1.96) .0270 (1.03) .0342 (1.25)
mms,t−1:3 -.0355* (-2.82) 0086 (0.19) -.0538** (-2.59)
aims,t−1:3 .1345** (2.01)
vcs,t−1:3 -.0343 (-0.52)
aim.smalls,t−1:3 -.0221*** (-4.01) .0338* (1.72) .1922** (2.10)
IV: buyouts .0018*** (3.20) .0020 (0.98)
IV: pension f. reform -.0014*** (-5.02) .0042*** (4.21)
IV: pension f. stamp 1.4537*** (6.15) 2.6016*** (3.09)
1st stage resid: aim -1.25e-11 (-0.65)
1st stage resid: vc -2.17e-11 (-0.29)
constant 1.3186*** (7.16) .9411 (1.43)
Sector FE yes yes yes
Time FE yes yes yes
| −ruleObservations 518 518 518
Groups 74 74 74
corr. resid. - buyouts .0764
corr. resid. - p.funds ref. .0195
corr. resid. - p. funds stamp -.0515
t statistics in parentheses. Legend: see Table 5.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 10: 2-Stage Residual Inclusion estimates of the Negative Binomial model of entry, when AIM IPO counts and
VC investment counts are suspected of endogeneity.
1st stage, AIM IPO counts 1st stage, VC invest. counts 2nd stage
aims,t−1:3, counts vcs,t−1:3, counts entrys,t
elast. elast. elast.
entrys,t−1:3 .0176** (2.57) .0692** (2.44) .1674** (2.46)
exits,t−1:3 .0118 (1.40) .0669* (1.92) -.0493 (-0.42)
ns,t−1:3 -.0017* (-1.72) -.0087** (-2.08) -.0673 (-0.49)
∆ophs,t−1:4 .0528 (1.18) .2955 (1.59) .0251 (1.06)
mms,t−1:3 counts -.5865*** (-7.65) .0898 (0.28) -.0381 (-1.30)
aims,t−1:3 counts .1116 (1.19)
vcs,t−1:3 counts .6085** (2.12)
aim.smalls,t−1:3 -.1255*** (-3.74) -.4901*** (-3.52) .2698*** (3.31)
IV: buyouts .0021 (0.61) .0631*** (4.39)
IV: pension f. reform -.0077*** (-4.54) -.0284*** (-4.06)
IV: pension f. stamp 4.910*** (3.42) 15.6025*** (2.62)
resid 1st stage: aim -3.68e-11 (-1.39)
resid 1st stage: vc 1.36e-11 (1.14)
constant 12.7487*** (11.39) 83.9535*** (18.08)
Sector FE yes yes yes
Time FE yes yes yes
Observations 518 518 518
Groups 74 74 74 74
corr. resid. - buyouts .0589
corr. resid. - p.funds ref. .0265
corr. resid. - p. funds stamp -.0778
t statistics in parentheses. Legend: see Table 5.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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